Iran’s Assembly of Experts has reportedly chosen Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.
What makes this controversial is not only the fact that the position effectively passed from father to son, which many critics say resembles a dynastic succession. There is also a religious legitimacy question.
Who can be Iran’s Supreme Leader ?
Under Iran’s Twelver Shia system, the Supreme Leader is supposed to be a high-ranking cleric capable of independent religious authority. In practice this means someone recognized as a top-level mujtahid with the ability to issue independent religious rulings.
However, Mojtaba Khamenei is not widely recognized as holding that rank among Shia clerics. He studied in Qom and has influence within political and security circles, especially the Revolutionary Guard, but he has never been acknowledged as a major religious authority in the way senior ayatollahs are.
This isn’t entirely unprecedented. When Ali Khamenei himself became Supreme Leader in 1989, he also did not initially meet the traditional clerical rank requirement, and the constitution was quickly amended to allow a leader with lower religious status.
Still, many Shia scholars argue that the position of Supreme Leader is supposed to be held by someone with clear and widely recognized religious authority, not primarily political power.
The influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Another key factor in Mojtaba’s rise is his longstanding relationship with Iran’s security apparatus; especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Mojtaba actually served in the IRGC during the final phase of the Iran–Iraq War, where he built personal relationships with many figures who later rose inside the organization. Over the decades he developed strong networks within the Guards and their intelligence structures, and analysts say he has been influential behind the scenes despite never holding a formal government office.
Reports also describe him as having deep support among the Revolutionary Guards, which played a major role in backing his succession.
Because the IRGC is already one of the most powerful institutions in Iran: controlling major military, intelligence, and economic sectors, many analysts believe his leadership could further strengthen the political influence of the Guards within the Iranian system.
So the debate now isn’t only political, it’s also theological: Can someone who is not widely recognized as a top Shia jurist legitimately serve as the highest religious authority of the Islamic Republic?
